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ABSTRACT
Today’s cloud apps are built from many diverse services that
are managed by different parties. At the same time, these
parties, which consume and/or provide services, continue to
rely on arcane static security and entitlements models. In
this paper, we introduce Seit, an inter-tenant framework that
manages the interactions between cloud services. Seit is a
software-defined reputation-based framework. It consists of
two primary components: (1) a set of integration and query
interfaces that can be easily integrated into cloud and ser-
vice providers’ management stacks, and (2) a controller that
maintains reputation information using a mechanism that is
adaptive to the highly dynamic environment of the cloud.
We have fully implemented Seit, and integrated it into an
SDN controller, a load balancer, a cloud service broker, an
intrusion detection system, and a monitoring framework. We
evaluate the efficacy of Seit using both an analytical model
and a Mininet-based emulated environment. Our analytical
model validate the isolation and stability properties of Seit.
Using our emulated environment, we show that Seit can pro-
vide improved security by isolating malicious tenants, re-
duced costs by adapting the infrastructure without compro-
mising security, and increased revenues for high quality ser-
vice providers by enabling reputation to impact discovery.
1. INTRODUCTION
Building and deploying any distributed “app” today
is radically different from a decade ago. Where tradi-
tional applications of the past required dedicated in-
frastructure and middleware stacks, today’s apps not
only run on shared—cloud—infrastructure, they rely on
many services, residing within and outside of underly-
ing cloud. An app, for example, can use Facebook for
authentication, Box for storage, Twilio for messaging,
Square for payments, Google AdSense for advertising,
etc. This trend of deploying and consuming services (of-
ten referred to as the mesh economy) can be seen by the
rapid growth of cloud platforms which integrate services
(and not just compute) like Amazon Web Services [1],
Microsoft Azure [10], Heroku [5], IBM BlueMix [6], and
CloudFoundry [2], to name a few. More importantly,
these emerging platforms further encourage the con-
struction of apps from even smaller—micro—services
(e.g., GrapheneDB, Redis, 3scale, etc.), where such ser-
vices are developed and managed by different tenants.
Despite the shift in how applications are being dis-
aggregated, the management of security between ser-
vices and tenants remains largely the same: one fo-
cused on a perimeter defense with a largely static se-
curity configuration. This is exacerbated by the iso-
lation mechanisms being provided by cloud providers.
It is also reinforced by the research community, which
has also focused on technologies that ensure isolation
[20, 32, 41, 47]. While isolation enables tenants to rea-
son about their perimeter, perimeter defense is widely
considered insufficient [16, 25, 36, 45, 49, 51, 52]. Attack-
ers are largely indistinguishable from innocent parties
and can rely on their relative anonymity to bypass the
perimeter. Furthermore, erecting virtual perimeters in
the cloud wastes an opportunity for efficiency optimiza-
tions available in a multi-tenant cloud infrastructure,
especially since inter-tenant communication has been
shown to be an important component in intra-cloud
data center traffic [15]. Such intra-cloud traffic will,
of course, only grow as apps move onto Platform as a
Service (PaaS) clouds like CloudFoundry, Heroku, and
IBM BlueMix.
The insufficient nature of static security configura-
tion has received some attention from the research
community in the form of highly programmable net-
work infrastructures such as software-defined network-
ing (SDN) [17, 28] and network function virtualiza-
tion (NFV) or software-defined middlebox infrastruc-
ture [11,13,19,23,34,39,44]. To date, existing research
has largely focused on the systems to enable a dynamic
security infrastructure, but leave the automated use of
these newly programmable infrastructures as an open
topic.
In this paper, we argue that the cloud needs a reputa-
tion system. Reputation systems leverage the existence
of many, collaborating parties to automatically form
opinions about each other. A cloud can leverage the
power of the crowd—the many interacting tenants—to
achieve three primary goals: (1) focus isolation-related
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resources on tenants that more likely cause problems,
(2) optimize communication between behaving parties,
and (3) enable a security posture that automatically
adapts to the dynamicity of tenants and services enter-
ing and leaving a cloud infrastructure.
In addition to the above three goals, we believe a
reputation-based system can encourage a culture of self-
policing. A report from Verizon [48] shows that a large
majority of compromises are detected by a third party,
not the infected party itself, as the infected software
starts interacting with external services. In service-
centric clouds, being able to monitor sentiment through
the reputation system will allow a good intentioned ten-
ant to know something is wrong (e.g., when its reputa-
tion drops). This is a missing feature in traditional,
security-centric infrastructures that are based on isola-
tion from others.
We introduce Seit1, a general reputation-based frame-
work. Seit defines simple, yet generic interfaces that
can be easily integrated into different cloud manage-
ment stacks. These interfaces interact with a reputation
manager that maintains tenant reputations and governs
introductions between different tenants. Together, the
interfaces and reputation manager enable reputation-
based service differentiation in a way that maintains
stable reputations at each tenant and separates misbe-
having tenants from well-behaved tenants. Specifically,
this paper makes the following contributions:
• An architecture that represents a practical real-
ization of an existing reputation mechanism that
is resilient to common attacks on reputation sys-
tems and adapted to support the operating envi-
ronment of the cloud’s dynamically changing be-
havior. We optimize that mechanism with a query
mechanism that supports the abstraction of a con-
tinuous query being performed.
• The demonstration of the feasibility with a proto-
type implementation and integration of Seit across
a number of popular cloud and network compo-
nents, including: Floodlight [3] (an SDN con-
troller), CloudFoundry [2] (a Platform as a Service
cloud), HAProxy [4] (a load balancer), Snort [37]
(an intrusion detection system), and Nagios [7] (a
monitoring system).
• A proof, through an analytical model, that the sys-
tem is able to effectively isolate bad tenants, and
that the system can remain stable despite the high
dynamics.
• The demonstration of the effectiveness of Seit and
the cloud components we integrated through an
evaluation that shows (1) an effective ability to
protect tenants from attackers by propagating in-
formation about malicious behavior by way of rep-
1Seit means reputation or renown in the Arabic language.
utation updates, (2) an effectiveness in reducing
costs of security middlebox infrastructure without
compromising security, and (3) the incentives to
provide good service in a PaaS cloud where users
have information about service reputation in se-
lecting a provider.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2 we survey related work. Section 3 high-
lights how a reputation-based system can benefit differ-
ent cloud environments, and also identifies key design
challenges. Section 4 describes the architecture of Seit.
Section 5 provides Seit’s implementation details. We
analyze the isolation and stability of properties of Seit
in Section 6. We evaluate Seit’s efficacy in Section 7.
The paper concludes in Section 8.
2. RELATED WORK
Seit builds on past research in cloud systems and rep-
utation systems. Here, we discuss these works.
Cloud Systems for Inter-tenant Communication.
Communication within clouds has largely focused on
isolation mechanisms between tenants. A few sys-
tems focused explicitly on handling inter-tenant com-
munication. In particular, CloudPolice [33] imple-
ments a hypervisor-based access control mechanism,
and Hadrian [15] proposed a new network sharing
framework which revisited the guarantees given to ten-
ants. Seit is largely orthogonal to these. Most closely
related to Seit is Jobber [38], which proposed using
reputation systems in the cloud. With Seit, we pro-
vide a practical implementation, demonstrate stability
and isolation, integrate with real cloud components, and
provide a full evaluation.
Reputation for Determining Communication.
Leveraging reputation has been explored in many ar-
eas to create robust, trust-worthy systems. For exam-
ple, Introduction-Based Routing (IBR) creates incen-
tives to separate misbehaving network participants by
leveraging implicit trust relationships and per-node dis-
cretion [18]. With Seit, we leverage IBR in a practical
implementation for a cloud system and extend it to sup-
port more dynamic use. Ostra [30] studied the use of
trust relationships among users, which already exist in
many applications (namely, social networks), to thwart
unwanted communication. Ostra’s credit scheme en-
sures the overall credit balance unchanged at any times
so that malicious, colluding users can pass credits only
between themselves, protecting against sybils. Sybil-
Guard [50] also uses social networks to identify a user
with multiple identities. At a high level, Ostra and Seit
have some similarity, namely in the objective of thwart-
ing unwanted communication. The biggest difference is
that Ostra was designed for person-to-person commu-
nication (email, social networks, etc.), whereas Seit is
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designed for machine-to-machine communication. This
then impacts how communication is handled. In Ostra,
communication is either wanted or unwanted; unwanted
communication is blocked. Seit goes beyond simply be-
ing able to block certain users and allows for a vari-
ety of responses. Further, being machine-to-machine as
opposed to being person-to-person impacts how feed-
back is handled. In Ostra, feedback was explicit based
on human input, whereas Seit integrates with a vari-
ety of systems that provide implicit feedback of varying
strength.
Reputation for Peer-to-peer Systems. In peer-
to-peer systems, reputation-based approaches involving
other participants are used for better decisions about
cooperation such as preventing free-riders and inau-
thentic file pieces in the system. For example, Eigen-
Trust [24] aims to filter inauthentic file pieces by main-
taining a unique global reputation score of each peer
based on the peer’s history of uploads. Dandelion [42],
PledgeRouter [26], FairTorrent [40], and one hop rep-
utation system [31] aim at minimizing the overhead
of maintaining reputation scores across peers either by
placing a central trusted server or by limiting the scope
of reputation calculations. Seit is targeting an environ-
ment where there is not a direct give-and-take relation-
ship; as such, we leverage a richer reputation mechanism
that maintains a graph of all user interactions and uses
it to determine local reputation for each user.
3. REPUTATION MATTERS
In this section, we elaborate on the potential benefits
provided by a cloud reputation-based system, covering
four different systems. Using these examples, we then
identify the key design challenges in building a cloud
reputation-based system.
3.1 Motivational Examples
Reputation-augmented SDN Controller. An IaaS
cloud provides tenants with an ability to dynami-
cally launch and terminate virtual machines (VMs).
The provider’s network is also becoming highly pro-
grammable using SDN approaches. SDN policies, in
general, use explicit rules for managing flows (block-
ing some, allowing some, or directing some through a
sequence of (security) middleboxes [17]). A reputation-
based system would extend the SDN interfaces to enable
flow control using implicit rules. Instead of a tenant
needing to specify, for example, specific flows to block,
it could specify that flows originating from sources with
low reputation scores should be blocked. This is il-
lustrated in Figure 1(a), where Tenant T2 is blocking
the traffic from T1. Likewise, the tenant can specify
a set of middlebox traversal paths that then get tied
to a given reputation score. This is illustrated in Fig-
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Figure 1: Example of an IaaS provider using a
reputation-based system
ure 1(b), where Tenant T3 views T1 as good, so gives
it a direct path; Tenant T3 also views T2 as suspect, so
forces its traffic through a middlebox.
Reputation-augmented PaaS Brokers. PaaS
clouds offer the ability to compose applications using
services provided by the platform. In some cases, a
PaaS cloud provides all of the services (e.g., Microsoft
Azure [10]). In other cases, platforms, such as Cloud-
Foundry [2], provide an environment where many ser-
vice providers can offer their services.
As illustrated in Figure 2, service consumers use a
broker to (1) discover services and (2) bind to them. Ser-
vice discovery, in general, implements a simple search
capability, focusing on returning one-to-one match with
the needed service (e.g., version 2.6 of MongoDB). With
a reputation-based system, service discovery can be en-
riched to include many new metrics that capture the
quality of service as perceived by other users. So, if two
different providers offer version 2.6 of MongoDB, then
consumers can reason about which service offer better
quality.
In a similar way, a reputation-based system can be
useful for service providers during the binding phase,
since it maintains historical information on consumers
of the service. In CloudFoundry, for example, the ser-
vice provider (e.g., MongoDB) is responsible to imple-
menting multi-tenancy. Most data stores do not cre-
ate separate containers (or VMs) per tenant; they sim-
ply create different table spaces for each tenant. With
a reputation-based system, service providers can im-
plement different tenant isolation primitives. An un-
trusted tenant is provisioned a separate container and
is charged more because of the additional computing
resources that are required.
Reputation-based Load Balancing. Tenants and
services can directly implement a reputation-based sys-
tem without explicit support from the cloud providers.
The resulting system in this setup would resemble a
peer-to-peer reputation-based system, where reputation
is used to provide differentiated services.
Figure 3 illustrates the integration of a reputation-
based system into a web service, where load balancers
are used to distribute client load across identical in-
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Figure 2: Example of a PaaS provider using a
reputation-based system
stances of the service. Typically, load balancers aim
for even distribution [8]. With a reputation-based sys-
tem, the web service can differentiate its users based on
their reputation, directing good/trusted clients to a set
of servers, and bad/untrusted clients to a different set
of servers.
Sentiment-based Self-policing. In traditional in-
frastructures, the administrator has great visibility of
what is happening inside of the infrastructure through
a variety of monitoring tools. The administrator, how-
ever, has limited visibility into how the infrastructure is
viewed externally. Major outages are obvious and are
easy to detect. Other types of issues might, at best, re-
sult in an email (or other reporting mechanism) being
sent to the administrator. Sentiment analysis is widely
used in corporations (e.g., monitor Twitter feeds to ob-
serve whether there is any positive or negative chatter
affecting its brand [14, 21]). With a reputation-based
system, a service can monitor its sentiment as perceived
by its consumers. By monitoring one’s sentiment, the
tenant can determine whether others are having a neg-
ative experience interacting with it, then trigger a root
cause analysis. This is supported by a report from Ver-
izon [48] which says that in many cases, infiltrations are
largely detected by external parties, not by the infected
party itself.
3.2 Design Challenges
Reputation systems have been used in peer-to-peer
systems to prevent leachers [24,35,40,42], and in person-
to-person communication systems to prevent unwanted
communication [30]. Applying to the cloud has the
unique challenges in being machine-to-machine, highly
variable, and highly dynamic interactions. In this sub-
section, we identify five design challenges when building
a cloud-based reputation-based system.
Integration. Cloud components and services come in
all shapes and sizes. Integrating a reputation-based
system do not require substantial development efforts.
Similar to service life-cycle calls in PaaS clouds [2], a
reputation-based system must define simple, yet generic
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Figure 3: Example of a tenant using a reputation-based
system
interfaces that can be easily implemented by service
providers. More importantly, the interfaces should sup-
port configurable query language that provides support
for efficient continuous query and feedback.
Interpretation of a Reputation. Depending on the
service, reputations can be interpreted in many ways.
Here, there is challenge in defining what constitutes
good or bad, and doing it automatically (i.e., a hu-
man will not be explicitly marking something as good
or bad). Even more, in machine-to-machine communi-
cation, an interaction is not necessarily binary (good or
bad), as there is a wide range of possible interactions.
Isolation. In a human-centric reputation-based sys-
tem (e.g., Stack Overflow [9]), a global user reputation
is desirable. In contrast, the cloud consists of a wide
variety of systems. The reputation mechanism must be
effective in clustering tenants into groups (e.g., to iso-
late bad tenants) based on both local (tenant) view and
global view.
Stability. The ability to isolate bad tenants prevents
system oscillations as tenants adjust their reputations:
instead, misbehaving tenants will converge to a low
reputation, and other tenants to a higher reputation.
Moreover, the reputation mechanism should be stable
to short-term fluctuations in behavior. For instance, if
a tenant accidentally misbehaves for a short time be-
fore resuming its normal behavior, it should be able to
eventually recover its reputation instead of being imme-
diately and permanently blacklisted by other tenants.
Resiliency. Finally, a reputation mechanism must be
resilient to attacks of the reputation mechanism itself.
In particular, an attacker falsely manages to build up
a good reputation before launching an attack by, for
example, sybils, or other tenants controlled by it that
effectively say good things about the attacker.
4. SEIT
Seit was designed with the above challenges in mind.
Figure 4 shows an overview of Seit’s architecture. Seit
includes a collection of interfaces that are specific to
the individual components and parties within the cloud.
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Figure 4: Seit’s architecture
Seit also consists of a centralized2 reputation manager
that interfaces with both the cloud provider(s) and each
tenant. In this section, we introduce these two main
components and describe how they address the above
challenges.
4.1 Integration Interfaces
To make Seit fully integratable into cloud systems,
we need interfaces between user components (e.g., fire-
walls, load balancers, network controllers, etc.) and the
reputation manager. Seit includes a framework to cre-
ate a shim around existing components. As shown in
Figure 5, Seit shims extend a component’s existing in-
terface with (potentially) two additional interfaces that
interact with Seit’s reputation manager. The two addi-
tional interfaces represent two subcomponents: inbound
and outbound logic. The shim’s inbound logic inter-
prets how incoming reputation updates should impact
the execution of the component. The outbound logic
translates how alerts, events, and status updates from
the component should impact the reputation that is sent
back to the reputation manager. Both inbound and out-
bound logics are component specific; some components
only implement one of these two logics. Here, we pro-
vide a few examples to clarify the design and interface
of shims:
• SDN Controller in IaaS Clouds: The IaaS net-
work controller is what manages the physical cloud
network. We assume that the network controller
has an interface to set up a logical topology (e.g.,
place a firewall in between the external network
and local network), and an interface to block traf-
fic.3 The shim’s inbound logic will extend these
capabilities to make use of reputations. For ex-
2We capitalize on the centralized nature of the cloud for this
implementation, but can envision a decentralized implemen-
tation which is less efficient, but equivalent in functionality.
3Even though former does not fully exist yet, we believe it
will as the API becomes richer and as research in the space
progresses.
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Figure 5: Seit shim generic interface.
ample, if reputation is less than 0, block; between
0 and 0.8, direct to a security middlebox; greater
than 0.8, provide a direct connection.
• PaaS Broker: The PaaS broker’s responsibility
is to effectively serve as a discovery mechanism for
services in the cloud. With Seit, we can extend it
to enrich and filter the results. Whenever a search
request arrives at the broker, the shim’s outbound
logic would interpose on the request and queries
the reputation manager to get the reputations of
the searched services; the inbound logic would then
sort and filter the results based on user-defined
criteria. For example, it may be configured to filter
out any services that would have less than a 0.3
reputation for a given user, and sort the remaining
results.
• Load Balancer: As mentioned earlier, a
reputation-augmented load balancer can be used
to provide differentiated services to trusted and
untrusted users. Here, the shim’s inbound logic
assigns new connections to servers based on the
tenant’s reputation score.
• Infrastructure Monitor: Infrastructure moni-
toring tools present information about the infras-
tructure to the administrators. Monitoring can be
used as a way to alert administrators of changes in
services reputations. This would be implemented
in the shim’s inbound logic. It can also be used to
update the reputation of services based on moni-
toring information (e.g., detecting port scans by a
tenant). This would be implemented in the shim’s
outbound logic.
• Intrusion Detection System: An intrusion de-
tection system (IDS) monitors network traffic and
looks for signatures within packets or performs be-
havioral analysis of the traffic to detect anomalies.
In this case, the shim’s outbound logic is designed
to intercept the alerts from the IDS, and allow
users to configure the feedback weights for each
alert type. For example, the shim can decrease
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the tenant’s reputation by 0.1 when seeing a con-
nection drop alert. Similarly, it can decrease the
reputation by 0.5 when seeing a port scan alert.
The above discussion presented only a few examples.
We envision all components being integrated with Seit
to provide feedback. For simplicity, the above discus-
sion also focused on negative feedback. Positive feed-
back is an important aspect as well. Positive feed-
back might be time-based, packet-based, or connection-
based. For example, a web server might provide pos-
itive feedback when it goes through an entire session
with well-formed http requests. An IDS might provide
positive feedback for every megabyte of traffic that does
not trigger an alert.
4.2 Reputation Manager
The reputation manager is responsible for maintain-
ing a view of the reputations as perceived by various
tenants. The core of the reputation manager is a repu-
tation graph and means to query the graph.
4.2.1 Reputation Graph
In Seit, reputation is modeled as a graph with nodes
representing tenants4 and edges representing one node’s
(tenant’s) view of the other node (tenant) when the
two have direct communication with each other. Here,
we describe the mechanism for building and using this
reputation graph.
Seit adapts the introduction-based routing (IBR) pro-
tocol [18] used in P2P networks for tenant interactions
because of its ability to incorporate feedback in a highly
dynamic graph, and its resilience to sybil attacks. IBR,
however, is not an intrinsic requirement of Seit. Seit
requires only that reputation scores are maintained for
each tenant’s view of other tenants and uses these scores
to determine the form of interaction between them. We,
thus, do not consider the full spectrum of reputation
system properties; considerations such as the possibil-
ity of gaming the system are out of the scope of this
paper.
Calculating Reputations. IBR in P2P networks al-
lows peers to use participant feedback as a basis for
making their relationship choices. While IBR can be
decentralized (as it was originally designed for P2P net-
works), in centralizing the design, we internally use the
IBR model, but eliminate the signaling protocol be-
tween peers. We give an example of IBR’s reputation
calculation in Figure 6. The main idea is that tenants
can pass feedback to each other based on their intro-
ductions to other tenants. Positive feedback results in
a higher reputation, and negative feedback in a lower
reputation.
4In the future, we will explore reputations for a finer gran-
ularity than tenants.
Nodes A, B, C and D in Figure 6 are peers. The
straight lines indicate established connections. Each
node maintains a reputation score (trust level) for the
nodes connected to it. When Node A wants to commu-
nicate with Node D, it must follow the chain of con-
nections between it and D and ask the nodes in the
chain for introduction to the node after. Node A starts
asking B for introduction to C. Node B looks at node
A’s behavior history (represented by reputation score
AB) from its local repository and decides whether or
not to forward A’s request to C. If the request is for-
warded, C looks at behavior history of B (BC) and de-
cides whether or not to accept the introduction request.
The process continues until A reaches D. If B, C, or
D rejects a request, node A will not be able to com-
municate with D. After the connection is established
between A and C, C assigns a reputations score to A
(CA) which is x×R(BC), where x is a scaling parameter
and R(BC) is the reputation score of B to A. Similarly,
D assigns reputations score of DA which is y×R(DC).
If A starts behaving negatively (e.g., sending malicious
packets to D), D will decrease A’s score DA and also
decreases C’s score DC since C took the responsibility
and introduced A to D. C will do the same and de-
crease A’s score AC and B’s score since it introduced
A to C. Finally, B will decrease A’s reputation score
AB. This approach ensures that nodes are especially
cautious about whom they introduce. Eventually, mis-
behaving nodes will be isolated, with no other nodes
will be willing to introduce them when their scores fall
under the minimum trust level score. We will show this
property in Section 6.
To reiterate, the IBR introduction mechanism is hid-
den from tenants. They simply ask for a connection
to another tenant and are informed whether a path is
available and accepted, and if so, what the reputation
score is.
Bootstrapping the Reputation Graph. When a
tenant joins Seit’s framework, it receives a default global
reputation score (assigned by the reputation manager)
and zero local reputation score until it begins to inter-
acts with other tenants. Upon being introduced to a
tenant, the introduced tenant’s initial reputation score
will be based on the introducer’s score; it can then
evolve based on the reputation calculations that we de-
scribe next. In general, the speed with which a tenant
builds a reputation depends on several factors such as
number of tenants it interact with, the services it pro-
vides to these tenants, and any privacy and security
threats to these tenants. A new tenant does, however,
have an incentive to provide good services: its actions
at one tenant can propagate to others through intro-
ductions, influencing its reputation at these other ten-
ants. Since individual tenants do not have a global view
of these introduction relationships, these dynamics also
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Figure 6: Illustration of IBR: (a) Tenant B is connected to Tenants A and C, and Tenant D is connected to Tenant
C, (b) A asks B to introduce it to C, and B agrees to perform the introduction, (c) C accepts the introduction and
starts communicating with A, (d) A asks C to introduce it to D, and C agrees to perform this introduction, (e) D
accepts the introduction and starts communicating with A.
make it difficult for a malicious tenant to target a par-
ticular victim, as it must first find an introduction chain
to reach the target.
4.2.2 Configurable Query Interface
In centralizing the IBR mechanism, we can provide
a highly configurable interface to query the reputation.
Here, we elaborate on both the initial query configura-
tion as well as for subsequent queries.
Initial Query. A reputation query can be as simple as
calculating the shortest path between two nodes, creat-
ing a new edge between the nodes, and then only up-
dating the direct edge between the two nodes upon rep-
utation feedback (direct feedback). In the reputation
mechanism we are using, the feedback also impacts the
edges of the initial path between the two nodes (indirect
feedback).
This adds an interesting aspect to the initial query:
should an intermediate node allow the search to include
certain outgoing edges in the query or not (or, in IBR
terms, whether a node should make an introduction).
To support each user’s flexibility, Seit provides the abil-
ity to configure two aspects:
• Outgoing Edge Selectivity: The idea behind
introduction-based routing is analogous to real life:
if a person I trust introduces someone, I am likely
to trust that person more than if they were a ran-
dom stranger. If I have a good interaction with
that person, it generally strengthens my trust in
the person that made the introduction. A bad in-
teraction can have the opposite effect. As such,
people are generally selective in introductions, es-
pecially in relationships where there is a great deal
of good will built up. In Seit, the tenant has full
control over the thresholds for which an introduc-
tion is made. They can introduce everyone with
a low threshold; they can also be selective with a
very high threshold.
• Query Rate Limit: A consideration in serving as
intermediate nodes (making introductions) is the
magnitude of the potential impact to one’s repu-
tation. For this, Seit includes the ability to limit
the rate at which a given node serves as an inter-
mediate node. In doing so, it allows the system
to adapt the reputations based on these new in-
teractions, so that future requests to serve as an
intermediate node will have that additional infor-
mation. As an extreme example, say there is no
rate limiting, Tenant A’s reputation is above the
threshold for Tenant B to introduce it to Tenant
C through Z. Tenant A then attacks C through
Z, and B’s reputation suffers accordingly. Instead,
if B was rate limited, A could only connect to C,
and need to build up good reputation with C, or
wait sufficient time, to be able to connect to the
other tenants.
Subsequent (implicit) Queries. In Seit, we support
the view that any interaction should reflect the current
reputation and that it is the current reputation that
should be used when handling any interaction. In other
words, a reputation query should be performed continu-
ously for all ongoing interactions. This, of course, would
be highly impractical.
Instead, Seit integrates triggers within the reputa-
tion manager. Reputation changes whenever feedback
is received—positive or negative. Within Seit, the ef-
fected paths through the graph that are affected by any
single edge update is tracked. Then, upon an update of
an edge due to feedback being received, Seit will exam-
ine a list of thresholds in order to notify a tenant when
a threshold has been crossed (which ultimately are sent
to each component).
These threshold lists come from the shims within each
tenant’s infrastructure. The shims are what the ten-
ant configures (or leaves the defaults) to specify actions
to take based upon different reputation values. When
a shim is initialized, or the configuration changes, the
shim will notify the Seit reputation manager of these
values.
5. IMPLEMENTATION
We have built a prototype of the Seit reputation man-
ager, and integrated it with several cloud components.
We discuss these here.
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Category System Description
IaaS SDN Controller Floodlight [3]
The shim maps the reputation to OpenFlow rules via the Floodlight REST
API to block or direct traffic.
PaaS Broker CloudFoundry [2]
The shim interfaces between the CloudFoundry broker and the CloudFoundry
command line interface (used by the users) to filter and sort the marketplace
results based on their reputation.
Load Balancer HAProxy [4]
This shim alters the configurations written in a haproxy.cfg file to specify
load balancing based on the reputation (directing tenants to servers based on
reputation). Upon every change, the shim will tell HAProxy to reload the
configuration.
Infrastructure Monitor-
ing
Nagios [7]
We took advantage of JNRPE (Java Nagios Remote Plugin Executor) [22] to
build a Java plugin that is listening for any reputations sent by Seit’s reputation
manager, and displays this sentiment and configures alerts for when sentiment
(collective reputation of the tenant running Nagios) drops.
Intrusion Detection
System
Snort [37]
Snort alerts are configured to log to Syslog. By using SWATCH [43] to monitor
Syslog, the Seit shim is alerted to all Snort alerts. The shim parses the alerts
and extracts information such as source IP and alert type and send the feedback
to the reputation manager.
Table 1: Implemented shims
We prototyped the reputation manager in approx-
imately 7300 lines of Java code. We implemented the
reputation manager as a scalable Java-based server that
uses Java NIO to efficiently handle a large number of
tenant connections. We also provided an admin API to
setup, install, and view policies across the cloud, as well
as facilitate new tenants and their services.
Rather than the reputation manager interfacing with
each component, within each tenant, we built a per-
tenant server to serve as a proxy between the tenant’s
components and the reputation manager. This proxy is
a light weight Java process that can be installed on any
tenant machine. It listens on two separate interfaces
for internal and external communications. The inter-
nal interface is used to communicate with a tenant’s
own components, while the external interface is used to
communicate with the reputation manager. The proxy
can be configured with a text configuration file that
specifies the following: (i) a list of components, each of
which has the name of the component, IP, type (ser-
vice, executor, sensor), component description and its
tasks; (ii) the edge selectivity threshold to specify when
to refuse or accept connections or introduction requests
from a tenant; and (iii) the query rate limit.
All communication in Seit is performed through a
common messaging interface. The API includes (1)
a registration request from the components when they
boot up for the first time, (2) a connection request when
one tenant requires communication with another ten-
ant, which includes both the initial request and a mes-
sage to approve (sent to both source and destination)
or reject the request (sent only to the source), (3) a
feedback message containing the components desire to
positively or negatively impact the reputation score for
a given connection (impacting both the reputation of
the other tenant, but also the introducers responsible),
and (4) a configuration message setting new thresholds
and query configurations.
We built a shim interface for a number of cloud com-
ponents, one for each example discussed in Section 4.1.
Table 1 summarizes these components.
6. ANALYSIS OF SEIT’S ISOLATION AND
STABILITY
Using IBR allows Seit to both separate misbehaving
tenants from well-behaved tenants and maintain stable
reputations at each tenant. In this section, we formally
show that these properties hold.
We consider an IBR system with N tenants, each of
whom desires services from other tenants and can pro-
vide some services in return.5 We consider a series of
discrete timeslots t = 0, 1, 2, . . . and use qij [t] ∈ [−1, 1]
to denote tenant i’s feedback on the services provided
by tenant j to i at time t. This feedback may include
both the received fraction of tenant i’s requested ser-
vice (e.g., 3GB out of a requested 5GB of SQL storage)
as well as whether the service was useful (e.g., sending
malicious packets). We let Rij [t] ∈ [0, 1] denote tenant
j’s reputation score at tenant i during timeslot t.
Tenants update their reputation scores in every
timeslot according to feedback from the previous times-
lot, as described in Section 4.2. We suppose that these
updates are linear in the feedback received, and define
qibrij [t] as a weighted average of the feedback qlk[t] pro-
vided by all tenant pairs that contribute to j’s repu-
tation at tenant i (e.g., including tenants that j intro-
duced to i). The reputation dynamics then follow
Rij [t+ 1] = max
{
(1− α)Rij [t] + αqibrij [t], 0
}
(1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter chosen by tenant i. A
larger α allows the reputations to evolve more quickly.
Isolation of Misbehaving Tenants. In typical sce-
narios, tenants will likely act based on their reputation
5Different tenants may provide different services; our anal-
ysis is agnostic to the type of the service.
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scores of other tenants: for instance, tenant i would
likely provide better service to tenants with higher rep-
utation scores. We can approximate this behavior by
supposing that the service provided by tenant j to ten-
ant i (and thus i’s feedback qij [t] on j’s service) is pro-
portional to i’s reputation score at j: qij [t] = ±Rji[t],
where the sign of qij [t] is fixed and determined by
whether tenant j is a “good” or “bad” tenant. The repu-
tation dynamics (1) are then linear in the Rij , allowing
us to determine the equilibrium reputations:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Reputations).
Equilibria of (1) occur when, for each pair of tenants
(i, j), either qibrij [t] = Rij [t] or Rij [t] = 0 and q
ibr
ij [t] < 0.
These equilibria are Lyapunov-stable, and the system
converges to this equilibrium.
Proof. We can find the equilibria specified by solv-
ing (1) with qij [t] = ±Rji[t]. To see that the equilibria
are Lyapunov-stable, we note that (1) can be written
as R[t+ 1] = ΣR[t], where R[t] is a vector of the Rij [t]
and Σ a constant matrix. It therefore suffices to show
that Σ has no eigenvalue larger than 1. We now write
Σ = (1 − α)I2N + αΣ1, where each row of Σ1 sums to
1 since qibrij is a weighted average. Thus, the maximum
eigenvalue of αΣ1 is α, and that of Σ is (1−α) +α = 1.
Since linear systems either diverge or converge to an
equilibrium and the Rij are bounded, the system must
converge to this (unique) equilibrium.
This result shows that equilibria are reached when ten-
ants agree with each others’ reputations: the overall
feedback qibrij [t] that tenant i receives from tenant j is
consistent with tenant j’s reputation at tenant i.
We can interpret Prop. 1’s result as showing that
at the equilibrium, tenants segregate into two different
groups: one group of “bad” tenants who provide bad-
quality service and have zero reputation, receiving no
service; and one group of “good” tenants with positive
reputations, who receive a positive amount of service.
Thus, tenants may experience a desirable “race to the
top:” good tenants will receive good service from other
good tenants, incentivizing them to provide even better
service to these tenants. Bad tenants experience an
analogous “race to the bottom.”
We illustrate these findings in Figure 7, which sim-
ulates the behavior of 100 tenants, 10 of which are as-
sumed to be malicious (qij [t] = −1). Tenants’ reputa-
tions are assumed to be specified as in (1) and are ran-
domly initialized between 0 and 1, with α = 0.1. The
figure shows the average reputation over time of both
bad and good tenants. We see that good tenants consis-
tently maintain high reputations at good tenants, while
bad tenants quickly gain bad reputations at all tenants.
Stability. While the analysis above considers binary
“bad” and “good” tenants, some “bad” misbehaviors are
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70
Av
er
ag
e 
re
pu
ta
tio
n
Timeslots
Bad serving badGood serving badBad serving goodGood serving good
Figure 7: Average reputations for“good”and“bad”ten-
ants over time.
not always malicious. For instance, tenants may occa-
sionally send misconfigured packets by accident. Such
tenants should be able to recover their reputations over
time, instead of being immediately blacklisted at the
client. Conversely, if malicious tenants occasionally
send useful traffic in order to confuse their targets, they
should not be able to improve their reputations perma-
nently. We now show that this is the case:
Proposition 2 (Reputation Stability). Let
{Rij [t], t ≥ 0} and
{
R′ij [t], t ≥ 0
}
respectively denote
the reputation scores given the feedback qibrij [t] and
q′ij
ibr
[t]. Suppose qibrij [0] 6= q′ij ibr[0] and qij [t] = q′ij [t]
for t > 0. Then limt→∞
∣∣Rij [t]−R′ij [t]∣∣→ 0.
The proof follows directly from (1). If tenants mis-
behave temporarily (qibrij [0] < 0 and q
′
ij
ibr
[0] > 0 but
qibrij [t] > 0), the effect of this initial misbehavior on their
reputations disappears over time.
7. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate both the performance
of Seit’s implementation through micro-benchmarks as
well as the benefits of using reputation in a number
of contexts. We used three large Linux servers to run
the experiments: Server 1: 64GB RAM, 24 Intel CPUs
(2.4GHz each), and running the reputation manager;
Server 2: 64GB RAM, 24 CPUs (2.4GHz each), and
running Mininet. Server 3: 32GB RAM, 12 Intel CPUs
(2.00GHz each), and running Floodlight.
7.1 Performance Overhead
Despite its benefits, a reputation-based system does
introduce some overheads. In this subsection, we study
the extent of these overhead.
Query Throughput and Latency. The reputation
manager performs a query when a tenant wants to con-
nect to another tenant. We performed a micro bench-
mark where we varied the number of tenants in the net-
work and calculated both the throughput (number of
queries per second) and latency (time to calculate a
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Figure 8: Reputation manager benchmark
single query on average) of our implementation. Shown
in Figure 8a is the throughput that the reputation man-
ager can handle for a given number of tenants. To cal-
culate throughput, we took a snapshot of the reputation
graph from a simulated execution, and injected queries
at a fixed rate. The max throughput was the maxi-
mum query rate we were able to achieve such that the
total time to receive all responses was within a small
threshold of the total time to send all queries (the re-
sponse time is linearly related to the request time until
overload, at which point it becomes exponentially re-
lated). Important to note is these results (i) reflects
initial queries, which will not be frequent, and (ii) re-
flects a single instance. This can be mitigated if the
reputation manager is designed as distributed compo-
nent (and left as future work). Shown in Figure 8b is
the average latency of a single query, on the order of
milliseconds. This is similar (in order of magnitude) to
the overheads imposed, for example, by a typical SDN
flow setup (and we expect queries to be less frequent
than flow setups).
Impact of Dynamic Behavior. To see how much dy-
namic behavior impacts an example component, we var-
ied the frequency of reputation change notifications sent
to an HAProxy component. In our setup with HAProxy
running in its own virtual machine, iperf [46] reported
HAProxy with a static configuration as being able to
achieve a rate of 8.08 Gbps. With Seit updating the
reputation (meaning the reputation changed to cross a
threshold) at a rate of once every second only reduced
the throughput of HAProxy to 7.78 Gbps; at (an ex-
treme) rate of once every millisecond, it reduced the
throughput to 5.58 Gbps.
7.2 Seit Benefits
The main motivation for using Seit is that it can im-
prove a variety of aspects of a cloud operation. Here,
we evaluate the benefit of Seit in three contexts chosen
to show: (i) security improvements, (ii) efficiency gains
(cost savings), and (iii) revenue gains.
7.3 Set up and Parameters
We built an evaluation platform using Mininet [27]
to emulate a typical cloud environment. In each exper-
iment, we run the Seit reputation manager along with
configuring a tenant setup specific to each experiment.
This evaluation platform allows us to specify four key
parts of an experiment:
• Graph Construction: How the graph is built (i.e.,
how interconnections are made).
• Sensor Configuration: What is the sensor (i.e.,
what does the sensor detect in order to provide
feedback)
• Reputation Use: What can be controlled (i.e.,
what component/configuration does reputation
impact).
• Traffic Pattern: What is the traffic pattern. Im-
portantly, in each case rates are chosen based on
the emulation platform limitations (absolute val-
ues of rates are not meaningful).
7.4 Improved Security by Isolating Attackers
One benefit of Seit is that it provides the ability to
cluster good participants and effectively isolate bad par-
ticipants. Here, we show Seit’s effectiveness in thwart-
ing a simulated denial of service (DoS) attack, where an
attacker overwhelms his victims with packets/requests
in order to exhaust the victim’s resources (or in the case
of elastically scalable services, cause the victim to spend
more money). In our evaluation, we are mimicking an
attack that happened on Amazon EC2 [12, 29], where
hackers exploited a bug in Amazon EC2 API to gain
access to other tenants accounts and then flood other
servers with UDP packets.
We considered three scenarios in each run. The first
scenario is a data center where tenants do not use any
kind of reputation feedback and each tenant indepen-
dently makes a local decision to block or allow commu-
nication. In the other two scenarios, tenants use Seit,
and thus report about any attacks they detect and use
reputation to isolate bad tenants. The only difference
between the two scenarios is the attack pattern. In one,
the attacker will attack its victims sequentially; in the
other, the attacker establishes connections with all of
its victims simultaneously and attacks them in parallel.
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• Graph Construction: For the graph construction,
we select the number of tenants for the given run
of the experiment. For each tenant, we select the
number of other tenants it connects to randomly
from 1 to 5. For each tenant, we set their ‘ten-
ant quality’: 3% are explicitly marked as attack-
ers with tenant quality of 0, the rest are randomly
assigned a quality metric from 0.1 to 1.0.
• Sensor Configuration: While Seit can support a
variety of sensors, in this experiment we use a sim-
plified model, where traffic explicitly consists of
good packets and bad packets, and a simple sen-
sor that detects“bad”packets with probability 0.9.
• Reputation Use: the IaaS network controller (in
our case, a Floodlight controller) will block a ten-
ant from being able to send traffic to another ten-
ant when the reputation of the sender drops below
some value.
• Traffic Pattern: Tenants generate traffic accord-
ing to a simplistic model of a fixed rate and fixed
inter-packet gap, where the probability of sending
a good packet or bad packet is based on the tenant
quality configuration (e.g., q < 0.05, represent-
ing a malicious tenant, always send bad packets,
0.05 <= q < 0.5, representing a careless tenant,
send bad packets infrequently, and in proportion
to the tenant quality, and 0.5 <= q, always send
good packets). Attackers send traffic at a rate 10
times higher than other tenants (1 every 10ms vs
1 every 100ms). Each attacker sends a total 100
packets to each target while the rest send 50 pack-
ets. Attackers deviate from the connection graph
determined above, instead attempt connection to
25% of the other tenants randomly.
We measured the total number of attack packets gen-
erated by attackers and the total number of these pack-
ets that reached the victims. We varied the total num-
ber of tenants in each run starting from 32 tenants up
to 1024 tenants.
As shown in Figure 9, without Seit, over 90% of the
attack packets will reach the victims, overloading the
security middleboxes. With Seit, on the other hand,
we are able to isolate the attacker. With more tenants
in the cloud, we should be able to block more attack
traffic as there will be greater amount of information
about the attacker. A byproduct that is not shown is
that, in this experiment, we are also decreasing the total
overall traffic on the network by blocking at the source.
7.5 Decreased Costs by Managing Middlebox
Chaining Policy
Another benefit of being able to differentiate users
with reputation is that we can decrease the cost of op-
erating security middleboxes, without compromising se-
curity. Here, we explore this benefit:
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
 32  64  128  256  512  1024%
 o
f b
ad
 p
ac
ke
ts 
re
ac
hin
g 
ho
sts
Number of tenants
Seit-seqSeit-paraW/o Seit
Figure 9: Effectiveness of protecting tenants in an IaaS
cloud
• Graph construction: The graph construction is
identical to the experiment in Section 7.4, except
that we fix the total number of tenants at 1024.
• Sensor configuration: The sensor configuration is
identical to the experiment in Section 7.4.
• Reputation Use: Each tenant will direct other ten-
ants connecting to it either through a middlebox
or allow the tenant to bypass the middlebox based
on the reputation of the connecting tenant. This
represents a simple middlebox chaining policy.
• Traffic Pattern: The traffic pattern is identical to
the experiment in Section 7.4.
We place the constraint that a single middlebox in-
stance can only handle 10 packets per second. This
then allows us to capture the tradeoff between cost and
security effectiveness (in our experiments, measured as
number of bad packets that ultimately reached an end
host).
We ran two variants of this experiment. In one vari-
ant we allow the number of middleboxes to scale to what
is needed to match the traffic in a given time interval.
In the other variant, we fix the budget to a specific
number of middleboxes, in which case, if the middle-
boxes are overloaded, they will fail to process every
packet. In each case, we calculate the total cost of op-
eration (number of middlebox instances needed) as well
as the security effectiveness (percentage of attack pack-
ets reached destination host). As shown in Figure 10,
we can see that using Seit has a distinct improvement
in security when being held to a fixed budget, and a
distinct reduction in cost when shooting for a specific
security coverage to handle the varying load.
7.6 Increasing Revenue by Managing PaaS
Broker Search
In PaaS clouds, such as CloudFoundry, service
providers offering similar service need a way to differen-
tiate themselves. With a reputation system as provided
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Figure 10: Resource saving and security
with Seit, service providers that have the highest qual-
ity of service get rewarded with more customers. Us-
ing the Seit integration with the CloudFoundry broker
which sorts and filters search results, we evaluate the
relationship between quality of service and revenue.
• Graph Construction: In this experiment, we have
1024 tenants, where we selected 256 tenants as ser-
vice providers, 256 tenants as both service provider
and service users, and the rest as service users only.
For simplicity, we assume all service providers are
providing identical services. To distinguish be-
tween service providers, we use four discrete tenant
quality values 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8 (higher is bet-
ter). To bootstrap the experiment, we create an
initial graph where for each service user tenant,
we randomly select the number of service provider
tenants it connects to (from 1 to 5).
• Sensor Configuration: Here, clients make requests
and receive responses. The sensor detects whether
a request got a response or not; Dropped requests
are proxy for poor service.
• Reputation Use: For a PaaS broker, service ten-
ant users perform a search for services to use. In
the broker, we filter and sort the search results ac-
cording to the service provider’s reputation. We
assume a client performs a new search every 20
seconds. The service user will choose among the
top results with some probability distribution (1st
search result chosen 85% of the time, 2nd result
10% of the time, 3rd result 5% of the time).
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• Traffic Pattern: As we are attempting to show the
incentive to a service provider, we make a simpli-
fying assumption that a service user always sends
a good request. The service provider will either
respond or not based on the tenant quality for
the given service provider. Every tenant sends a
packet every second to the service provider con-
necting to. If a tenant receives a response, it will
increase the reputation of the service provider and
update its neighbor with this information. If no
response received, the same process will happen
but with a negative impact.
We run the experiment for two minutes, and as a
proxy for revenue, we count the number of times a ser-
vice user selects a given service provider. As shown in
Figure 11, the expected benefits hold. As tenants with
the greatest tenant quality (0.8) had a greater revenue
(showing over 2000 times they were selected), while ten-
ants with lowest tenant quality had the least revenue
(being selected around 300 times).
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Cloud systems today are fostering ecosystems of in-
teracting services. In this paper, we presented Seit as
an inter-tenant framework that manages the interac-
tions within the cloud through the use of a reputation-
based system. The Seit architecture overcomes key
challenges of using a reputation system in cloud envi-
ronments around integration, isolation, stability, and
resiliency. Using practical implementation, we demon-
strate Seit’s benefits across a wide spectrum of cloud
services. As future work, we plan to integrate more
components and improve the overall performance of
Seit. We also want study the implications of incre-
mental deployments, where some tenants do not im-
plement Seit. Finally, we want to study scalability
challenges when managing a large number of compo-
nents and tenants, especially across autonomous geo-
distributed clouds.
12
9. REFERENCES
[1] Amazon Web Services. http://aws.amazon.com/.
[2] Cloud Foundry. http://docs.cloudfoundry.org.
[3] Floodlight. http://floodlight.openflowhub.org/.
[4] HAProxy. http://www.haproxy.org.
[5] Heroku: Cloud Application Platform.
https://www.heroku.com/.
[6] IBM Codename: BlueMix.
https://ace.ng.bluemix.net/.
[7] Nagios. http://www.nagios.org/.
[8] NGINX. http://nginx.com.
[9] Stack overflow. http://stackoverflow.com/.
[10] Windows Azure Platform.
https://www.windowsazure.com/en-us/.
[11] Network Functions Virtualisation: An Introduction,
Benefits, Enablers, Challenges and Call for Action.
http://portal.etsi.org/NFV/NFV_White_Paper.pdf,
2012.
[12] Amazon. Possible Insecure Elasticsearch
Configuration. http:
//aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/
possible-insecure-elasticsearch-configuration/,
May 2014.
[13] J. W. Anderson, R. Braud, R. Kapoor, G. Porter, and
A. Vahdat. xOMB: Extensible Open Middleboxes with
Commodity Servers. In Proc. of ACM/IEEE ANCS,
Austin, TX, Oct. 2012.
[14] R. Balasubramanyan, B. R. Routledge, and N. A.
Smith. From tweets to polls: Linking text sentiment to
public opinion time series. In Proc. AAAI Conference
on Weblogs and Social Media, 2010.
[15] H. Ballani, K. Jang, and T. Karagiannis. Chatty
Tenants and the Cloud Network Sharing Problem.
Proc. of NSDI, 2013.
[16] Y. Bartal. Firmato: A novel firewall management
toolkit the hebrew university of jerusalem. Proceedings
of the 1999 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, 22(4):381–420, 2004.
[17] M. Casado, M. J. Freedman, J. Pettit, J. Luo,
N. McKeown, and S. Shenker. Ethane: Taking control
of the enterprise. ACM SIGCOMM Computer
Communication Review, 37(4):1–12, 2007.
[18] G. Frazier, Q. Duong, M. Wellman, and E. Petersen.
Incentivizing responsible networking via
introduction-based routing. Trust and Trustworthy
Computing, 6740, 2011.
[19] A. Gember-Jacobson, R. Viswanathan, C. Prakash,
R. Grandl, J. Khalid, S. Das, and A. Akella. OpenNF:
Enabling Innovation in Network Function Control. In
Proc. SIGCOMM, 2014.
[20] C. Guo, G. Lu, H. J. Wang, S. Yang, C. Kong, P. Sun,
W. Wu, and Y. Zhang. SecondNet: A Data Center
Network Virtualization Architecture with Bandwidth
Guarantees. In Proc. CoNEXT, 2010.
[21] D. Henschen. 10 tips: Tap consumer sentiment on
social networks. http://www.informationweek.com/
software/information-management/
10-tips-tap-consumer-sentiment-on-social\
-networks/d/d-id/1105234, July 2012.
[22] JNRPE. Java Nagios Remote Plugin Executor.
http://www.jnrpe.it/cms/index.php.
[23] D. A. Joseph and I. Stoica. Modeling Middleboxes.
IEEE Network, 22(5), 2008.
[24] S. D. Kamvar, M. T. Schlosser, and H. Garcia-Molina.
The Eigentrust Algorithm for Reputation
Management in P2P Networks. In Proc. International
Conference on World Wide Web (WWW), 2003.
[25] A. Kaplan. Defending Data: An Inside Look at How
Corporate Security Officials Are Navigating a
Constantly Shifting Information Landscape. http:
//www.nuix.com/analyst-briefs/defending-data,
2014.
[26] R. Landa, D. Griffin, R. Clegg, E. Mykoniati, and
M. Rio. A sybilproof indirect reciprocity mechanism
for peer-to-peer networks. In INFOCOM 2009, IEEE,
pages 343–351, April 2009.
[27] B. Lantz, B. Heller, and N. McKeown. A Network in a
Laptop: Rapid Prototyping for Software-Defined
Networks. In Proc. of ACM HotNets, Monterey,
California, 2010.
[28] N. McKeown, T. Anderson, H. Balakrishnan,
G. Parulkar, L. Peterson, J. Rexford, S. Shenker, and
J. Turner. OpenFlow: Enabling Innovation in Campus
Networks. ACM SIGCOMM CCR, 38(2), Apr. 2008.
[29] R. Millman. Hackers target Elasticsearch to set up
DDoS botnet on AWS. http://www.cloudpro.co.uk/
cloud-essentials/cloud-security/4353/
hackers-target-elasticsearch-to-set-up\
-ddos-botnet-on-aws, Aug. 2014.
[30] A. Mislove, A. Post, P. Druschel, and P. K. Gummadi.
Ostra: Leveraging trust to thwart unwanted
communication. In Proc. of USENIX NSDI, San
Francisco, CA, Apr. 2008.
[31] M. Piatek, T. Isdal, A. Krishnamurthy, and
T. Anderson. One hop reputations for peer to peer file
sharing workloads. In Proceedings of the 5th USENIX
Symposium on Networked Systems Design and
Implementation, NSDI’08, pages 1–14, Berkeley, CA,
USA, 2008. USENIX Association.
[32] L. Popa, G. Kumar, M. Chowdhury,
A. Krishnamurthy, S. Ratnasamy, and I. Stoica.
FairCloud: Sharing the Network in Cloud Computing.
In Proc. SIGCOMM, 2012.
[33] L. Popa, M. Yu, S. Y. Ko, S. Ratnasamy, and
I. Stoica. CloudPolice: Taking Access Control out of
the Network. In Proc. Workshop on Hot Topics in
Networks (HotNets), 2010.
[34] Z. A. Qazi, C.-C. Tu, L. Chiang, R. Miao, V. Sekar,
and M. Yu. SIMPLE-fying middlebox policy
enforcement using SDN. In Proc. of ACM SIGCOMM,
Hong Kong, China, Aug. 2013.
[35] D. Qiu and R. Srikant. Modeling and performance
analysis of bittorrent-like peer-to-peer networks. ACM
SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review,
34(4):367–378, 2004.
[36] T. Ristenpart, E. Tromer, H. Shacham, and S. Savage.
Hey, You, Get off of My Cloud: Exploring Information
Leakage in Third-party Compute Clouds. In Proc.
Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS), 2009.
[37] M. Roesch. Snort - Lightweight Intrusion Detection
for Networks. In Proc. of USENIX LISA, Nov. 1999.
[38] A. Sayler, E. Keller, and D. Grunwald. Jobber:
Automating inter-tenant trust in the cloud. In Proc.
Workshop on Hot Topics in Cloud Computing
(HotCloud), 2013.
[39] V. Sekar, N. Egi, S. Ratnasamy, M. K. Reiter, and
G. Shi. Design and Implementation of a Consolidated
Middlebox Architecture. In Proc. of USENIX NSDI,
San Jose, CA, Apr. 2012.
[40] A. Sherman, J. Nieh, and C. Stein. FairTorrent: A
Deficit-based Distributed Algorithm to Ensure
Fairness in Peer-to-peer Systems. IEEE/ACM
13
Transactions on Networking, 20(5):1361–1374, Oct
2012.
[41] A. Shieh, S. Kandula, A. Greenberg, C. Kim, and
B. Saha. Sharing the data center network. In Proc.
USENIX Conference on Networked Systems Design
and Implementation (NSDI), 2011.
[42] M. Sirivianos, J. H. Park, X. Yang, and S. Jarecki.
Dandelion: Cooperative content distribution with
robust incentives. In 2007 USENIX Annual Technical
Conference on Proceedings of the USENIX Annual
Technical Conference, ATC’07, pages 12:1–12:14,
Berkeley, CA, USA, 2007. USENIX Association.
[43] SWATCH. Simple log watcher.
http://sourceforge.net/projects/swatch/.
[44] D. L. Tennenhouse, J. M. Smith, W. D. Sincoskie,
D. J. Wetherall, and G. J. Minden. A survey of active
network research. IEEE Communications Magazine,
35:80–86, 1997.
[45] J. Thompson. Why Perimeter Defenses Are No Longer
Enough. http://www.darkreading.com/
why-perimeter-defenses-are-no-longer-enough/a/
d-id/1235005, 2014.
[46] A. Tirumala, F. Qin, J. Dugan, J. Ferguson, and
K. Gibbs. Iperf: The TCP/UDP bandwidth
measurement tool.
http://dast.nlanr.net/Projects/Iperf, May 2005.
[47] V. Varadarajan, T. Ristenpart, and M. Swift.
Scheduler-based Defenses against Cross-VM
Side-channels. In 23rd USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX Security), San Diego, CA, Aug. 2014.
[48] Verizon. 2014 data breach investigations report.
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/, 2014.
[49] A. Wool. A quantitative study of firewall configuration
errors. Computer, 37:62–67, 2004.
[50] H. Yu, M. Kaminsky, P. B. Gibbons, and A. D.
Flaxman. SybilGuard: Defending Against Sybil
Attacks via Social Networks. IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networks, 16(3):576–589, June 2008.
[51] Y. Zhang, A. Juels, M. K. Reiter, and T. Ristenpart.
Cross-VM Side Channels and Their Use to Extract
Private Keys. In Proc. Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS), 2012.
[52] Y. Zhang, A. Juels, M. K. Reiter, and T. Ristenpart.
Cross-Tenant Side-Channel Attacks in PaaS Clouds.
In Proc. Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS), 2014.
14
